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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This Briefing Paper looks at the development of personal information privacy law in New South 
Wales.  It examines the historical context in which privacy emerged as a significant concern that 
warranted statutory protection and regulation. [1] – [2] 
 
The paper commences by identifying the imprecise nature of concepts of privacy and difficulties 
in providing a comprehensive definition.  Consideration is then given to the different categories 
of privacy that combine to give the overall theme of privacy character and content. [3]  
 
Following on from this, the paper briefly touches on the obligations under international law 
relating to privacy and how that, together with domestic issues, had an influence on privacy 
legislation in Australia. [4] – [6]  
 
The paper then provides a brief examination of the Privacy Act, including the Information 
Protection Principles, the code that forms the basis of privacy law in New South Wales.  It then 
turns to the possible development of the tort of privacy at common law, with some reference to 
foreign jurisprudence and a possible statutory tort of privacy. [7] – [9]  
 
Some of the issues regarding the patchy and fragmented nature of the privacy regime in Australia 
are discussed before a brief assessment of new and emerging technologies that are potentially 
privacy-intrusive. [10 – 13]  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
  
This Briefing Paper looks closely at what privacy is and examines its legal development in New 
South Wales.  The paper also touches on some of the concerns facing privacy, both from the 
regulatory standpoint and through changes brought about by technological progress. 
 
Privacy is a largely elusive concept that has proven to be notoriously difficult to define.1 As, 
such, it has been argued that privacy is a value better experienced than defined.2   
 
The word ‘privacy’ is derived from the Latin root ‘privare’ meaning, to deprive of access to the 
public sphere.  That is, to be separate, secluded and free from the unwanted intrusion of others. 3 
 The genesis of the modern concept of privacy viewed through the legal prism can be found in 
the landmark article written by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren in 1890, ‘The Right to 
Privacy’.  In it, Brandeis and Warren argue that privacy is, fundamentally, ‘the right to be let 
alone’. 4   
 
In its 1983 report on privacy, the Australian Law Reform Commission elaborated on Brandeis 
and Warren’s initial definition to describe privacy as ‘part of the claim that the autonomy of each 
individual should be protected and his integrity respected.’5  The report found the privacy 
involves numerous aspects, including:   
 
• that the person of the individual should be respected, that is, not interfered with, without 
consent; 
 
• that the individual should be able to exercise a measure of control over relationships with 
others, including the ability to exercise an appropriate measure of control on the extent to 
which his / her correspondence, communications and activities are available to others in 
the community; 
 
• that the individual should be able to control the extent to which information about him / 
her is available to others in the community.6 
 
The nebulous nature of privacy is such that it means different things to different people with 
many factors influencing personal perceptions.  For some, privacy is fundamentally about 
maximising his or her own anonymous space and limiting what other people can observe.  To 
others, it is about control of their personal information, to whom it is disclosed and who has 
access to it.  In some respects, privacy is culturally relative, with what may be considered 
                                                 
1 See Raymond Wacks, Personal Information, Oxford University Press, 1989 at p 13 – 18.  
2 Brett Mason, Privacy without principle: The use and abuse of privacy in Australian law and public policy, 
Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne 2006 at p 1. 
3 Moira Paterson, Freedom of Information and Privacy in Australia: Government and Information Access in 
the Modern State, LexisNexis Butterworths 2005 at p 15. 
4 LD Brandeis and SD Warren, ‘The right to privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193 at p 195. 
5 Australian Law Reform Commission, Privacy, paras 1032  -1033.  
6 Ibid.  
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privacy-intrusive behaviour in some cultures accepted as appropriate in others.7   
 
Similarly, the degree of importance ascribed to privacy varies according to individual values and 
circumstances.  For some, openly disclosing intimate aspects of their personal lives and being 
recorded on camera may not be concerning.  For others, however, even the mere disclosure of a 
phone number can be considered an egregious interference with their privacy.  This might be 
especially so if that person is concerned about receiving unsolicited marketing calls or, more 
importantly, has concerns for their security as a result of their phone number being disclosed.   
  
Privacy is therefore a highly personal quality and how we define it, together with the importance 
we place on it, is highly subjective. 
 
Privacy is also time relative.  A century ago, protecting oneself from interferences to privacy 
may have been as simple drawing a curtain or closing a door.  Today, advances in technology 
and its increasing popularity have added stress to privacy and further complicated the ways in 
which we can protect privacy.8  
  
2 PRIVACY AS A HUMAN RIGHT?  
 
The Australian Privacy Charter states: 
 
People have a right to privacy of their own body, private space, privacy of 
communications, information privacy (rights concerning information about a person) and 
freedom of surveillance.9 
 
Whether or not privacy itself is a ‘right’ as such, has also been the subject of considerable 
academic debate.  Some have regarded privacy as one of many human interests that must 
compete in a marketplace against other equally valid but sometimes conflicting interests.  In its 
1983 report on privacy, the ALRC noted that privacy interests are not absolute, but must be 
weighed against other interests.10  The Office of the Privacy Commissioner has also noted that a 
balance has to be achieved between the needs of the individual and the broader community.11 
 
Alternatively, it has been argued that privacy is a human right, on par with the most fundamental 
of human rights and cannot be abrogated or varied merely for convenience’s sake.  This 
argument is backed up by the fact that privacy is proclaimed as a right under article 12 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.12  
                                                 
7 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Privacy Law: Options for Reform Information Paper, July 2001 at p 3. 
8 Ibid.  
9 Preamble to the Australian Privacy Charter at http://www.privacy.org.au/About/PrivacyCharter.html, 
accessed 7 July 2008.  
10 Law Reform Commission, Privacy, ALRC Report No. 22, Volume 1, 1983 at p 20.  
11 Committee Hansard, 19 May 2005, p. 51 in Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, 
The Real Big Brother: Inquiry into the Privacy Act 1988, June 2005 at p 8. 
12 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html, accessed 7 July 
2008. 
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A compromise position between privacy as a ‘right’ and an ‘interest’ is that privacy is a right, but 
one that does not rank highly in the hierarchy of rights.13   
 
3  CATEGORIES OF PRIVACY 
 
A better understanding of privacy can be achieved by examining four separate, yet related, 
categories.  Although different, each category touches on certain aspects of what is commonly 
understood to refer to privacy.  
 
3.1 Surveillance 
 
Surveillance is defined as ‘the systematic observation or recording of one or more people’s 
behaviour, communication, or personal information’.14  In its most basic form, surveillance is 
about ‘peeping toms’ and eavesdroppers.  However, technological progress has meant that 
surveillance today is more about the visual and audio recordings of an individual and his or her 
conversations or actions: CCTV, for example, streams footage of people in the public domain 
and tracking what Internet sites a person has visited from the comfort of their home computer.  In 
the extreme, surveillance is epitomised by George Orwell’s dystopian society in ‘1984’ and the 
notion of the all-intrusive ‘Big Brother’, ubiquitously observing the movements of subjects under 
its control.  Naturally, in a free society, people want to go about their daily lives free from the 
prying eyes and ears of others and a healthy society maximises the ability in which an individual 
can retain a fair degree of anonymous space. 
 
Surveillance privacy is largely regulated separately from other forms of privacy (notably, 
information privacy) and in New South Wales has been covered by various Acts.  Surveillance 
privacy law is designed to ensure that individuals are reasonably able to go about their lives 
without being tracked and, if they are tracked for legitimate reasons, then ensuring the collection 
of the information that has been intercepted is appropriately handled.  
 
In New South Wales, the Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 regulates and restricts the use of 
surveillance technologies in the place of one’s employment.15  Meanwhile, the Surveillance 
Devices Act 2007 regulates the installation, use and maintenance of optical, listening or tracking 
devices by individuals and restricts their ability to observe, through these technologies, 
conversations and images to which they are not a party to.16 A brief outline of both Acts is 
summarised below.  
 
The Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 repealed the previous Workplace Video Surveillance Act 
1998.  In doing so, the new Act broadened the definition of ‘surveillance’ from being merely 
about video surveillance, to also including computer surveillance (such as email monitoring) and 
tracking surveillance (through the use of GPS technologies).  
                                                 
13 Carolyn Doyle & Mirko Bagaric, Privacy Law in Australia, The Federation Press 2005 at p 50. 
14 The Australian Privacy Charter (1995) 2Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 44. 
15 Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW) ss 9 – 22.  For a detailed analysis of the Act see Lenny Roth, 
Workplace Surveillance, NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service 2004. 
16  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) ss 7 – 14 
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The Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 provides that an employer can only undertake surveillance 
of an employee provided that the employer has first notified the employee of the surveillance that 
will take place.17  Further, the Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 prohibits surveillance in certain 
circumstances (such as camera surveillance in change rooms)18 and limits the ability to undertake 
covert surveillance to circumstances where a Magistrate has issued a covert surveillance 
authority for the purposes of establishing whether an employee is engaged in any unlawful 
activity.19  Importantly, a Magistrate must consider whether covert surveillance of the employee 
or employees concerned might unduly intrude on their privacy or the privacy of any other 
person.20 
 
The Surveillance Devices Act 2007 replaces the Listening Devices Act 1984 and ‘is broader both 
in its application and effect’.21 Like the Workplace Surveillance Act 2005, the Surveillance 
Devices Act 2007 extends the application of surveillance to include data surveillance and 
tracking surveillance, placing general prohibitions on the use of these technologies unless 
consent is provided or for a ‘lawful purpose’. Specifically, sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the Act 
respectively prohibit the use of listening devices, optical devices, tracking devices and data 
surveillance.  Breaches of these provisions are criminal offences and can attract heavy penalties.  
 
The Act prohibits a person from publishing or communicating to any other person, any record or 
a report of private conversations that came to their knowledge as a result of direct or indirect 
surveillance in contravention of the Act.  To this end, the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 seeks to 
limit the interference with the privacy of the affected individual by not only prohibiting covert 
surveillance of the individual but also seeking to limit the damage caused by prohibiting the 
dissemination of any information that was ascertained from the surveillance.  
 
Much of the recent legislation passed has been influenced by increasing community concern 
about ‘snoops’ and ‘peeping toms’ using emerging technologies, such as camera phones, to take 
covert and improper photos of unwitting and unwilling parties.  Although fear about ‘peeping 
toms’ is not new, technological advancement has made spying on people easier, and spreading 
the images or sounds that are captured even easier than that.  Recent examples have been 
reported in the media where men have been caught taking inappropriate photos of women with 
their camera phones.22  
 
But surveillance does not need to be so obvious.  Merely surfing the Internet throws wide open 
the door to creative uses of surveillance.  From the use of cookies that track a user’s movements 
across the web, to spyware programs that surreptitiously collect information about a user’s 
                                                 
17 Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW) ss 10  
18 Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW) ss 15 –18  
19 Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW) ss 23 – 35  
20 Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW) s 26 
21 Sophie Dawson & Helen Gill, Surveillance and the media: working within the confines of the new NSW 
Surveillance Devices Act, (2008) 4(9) Priv LB at pp 110 – 115.  
22  Rick Wallace, ‘Laws crack down on ‘upskirt’ snappers’, The Daily Telegraph, 28 July 2006. 
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browsing activities, to keystroke monitoring,23our increasing reliance on an electronic existence 
has meant that we invariably leave behind traceable, digital fingerprints.  
 
While legislation seeks to regulate the use of surveillance technologies, one of the ongoing 
concerns is that the very nature of covert surveillance is that affected individuals are not aware 
that it is taking place.  Every day, reams of personal data could be compiled and collated without 
any obvious indication to the affected person that this is taking place.  
 
Some of the concerns about privacy-invasive technologies are discussed later.   
 
3.2 Communications Privacy 
 
Similarly related to surveillance privacy, communications privacy is about protecting the 
integrity of correspondence and the information contained in that correspondence. Threats to 
communications privacy have been addressed in the Surveillance Acts discussed above but 
prohibitions against interceptions are provided for in the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 
1979 (Cth).  
 
Specifically, Part 13 of the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth) obliges carriers 
and carriage service providers to maintain the confidentiality of the contents or substance of 
communications carried through their systems.  The Act prohibits the interception of 
communications over a telecommunications system.  Communication is defined broadly to 
include, not just speech, but also texts, visual images, data and signals, along with any 
combination of these forms.24 Interception is understood to mean listening to or recording 
communications that take place over a telecommunications system without the knowledge of the 
parties to the communication.25 However, there are numerous exceptions to this rule.  For 
example, the protection against interception does not apply to employees against their employers 
in the course of their employment.26   
 
Meanwhile, Part 7B of the Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989 (Cth) obliges postal carriers 
to adhere to strict conditions to maintain the integrity of mail being processed through the course 
of the post.  The Act places strict limits on postal employees from opening and examining mail 
unless required to do so for security or quarantine reasons.27  The Act also prohibits employees 
and former employees from using and disclosing information derived from the mail unless in 
certain, specifically prescribed circumstances, such as under the authority of a warrant.28  
 
3.3 Bodily Privacy 
 
                                                 
23 Such as the Trojan horse ‘Zlob Trojan’.  
24 Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) s 7 
25 Carolyn Doyle & Mirko Bagaric, Privacy Law in Australia, The Federation Press 2005 at p 141. 
26 Ibid at p 142. 
27 Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989 (Cth), ss 90M – 90X  
28 Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989 (Cth), ss 90G – 90LF  
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Bodily privacy is about ensuring that the physical body is not subjected to arbitrary interferences, 
either by the State (such as unwarranted searches by police) or by other individuals (such as 
assault, battery and false imprisonment).  Bodily privacy is fundamentally about respecting the 
integrity of the physical self and protecting the ‘personal space’ that immediately surrounds the 
body from unsolicited encroachment.  
 
Whether or not there is a right to ‘bodily privacy’ is the subject of much discussion.  For the 
most part, an interference with ones’ bodily integrity has not been historically regarded as an 
invasion of privacy per se, but has been examined through the prism of other torts, such as 
nuisance, trespass or false imprisonment.   Depending on the severity of the invasion, the 
interference with one’s bodily integrity may be criminal in nature, for example in instances of 
assault and battery.  
 
Bodily privacy is not also about limiting the ability to take samples and extract information from 
the body.   A common example is that motorists will often be required to submit to breathalysers 
that monitor blood alcohol levels or face arrest for failure to cooperate.  Technological 
advancement has meant that retina scans, DNA tests and even psychometric testing are all 
possible.   
 
While the collation of the data obtained form collections of this nature is covered under laws 
regulating information privacy, undergoing these scans or tests may be considered an affront to 
bodily privacy and, for some individuals, a deeply personal and violating experience.    
 
3.4 Territorial Privacy 
  
Territorial privacy is about allowing individuals a right to a private sphere in which to conduct 
their personal affairs without interference or surveillance and a degree of control over access to 
one’s private domain.  This right applies not only in a person’s home but also to varying degrees, 
in the workplace, the use of recreational facilities and public places.29  Privacy is also a latent 
consideration when spatial concerns are factored into planning laws, or when limitations are 
placed on real estate agent inspections in residential tenancy laws.   
  
Violations of territorial privacy may often result from a breach of a (non-privacy related) Act, 
can be examined through the tort of trespass or, increasingly, may be examined through the tort 
of privacy at the common law.  
 
3.5 Personal Information Privacy 
 
Personal information privacy has been defined as  
 
the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, 
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others. 30  
 
Personal information is fundamentally about the control of data that identifies and defines 
individuals, the individual having a say who has access to the information about them and why, 
                                                 
29 See cl. 8 of the Australian Privacy Charter at www.privacy.org.au accessed 21 May 2008.  
30 Allan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom, Atheneum New York 1967 at p 7. 
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as well as how the information is gathered, stored and used.31  
 
Understanding what is considered personal information is inexact.  Personal information has two 
requisite parts, that which is personal i.e. that which identifies an individual, and that which is 
information i.e. facts or opinions about the individual that gives meaning and character to the 
individual’s identity.   
 
Legally, personal information itself has been defined as: 
 
information or an opinion (including information or an opinion forming part of a 
database), whether true or not, and whether recorded in a material form or not, about an 
individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained, from the 
information or opinion.32  
 
The sweeping nature of this definition captures a wide amount of information.  Personal 
information can therefore mean to include such data as a name and may include addresses, dates 
of birth and occupations as well as medical conditions and financial details.  In fact, any article 
of information or permutation of bits of information about an individual can be deemed ‘personal 
information’ if the information gives rise to an identity that is ‘apparent’ or can ‘reasonably be 
ascertained’.  
 
Often, information can only be deemed as personal after consolidating disparate pieces of data 
that, if left isolated, would fail to identify the individual.  For example, quarantining information 
about a person’s date of birth, occupation and residence would be meaningless but once 
aggregated, may accurately reveal the identity of the person.  In this regard, ‘personal 
information’ is almost entirely context-sensitive and relative to other people.   
 
In Australia, legislation has been introduced at the Federal level and in some States that regulates 
personal information.  At the Federal Level, the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) obliges most 
Commonwealth Government agencies, together with some parts of the private sector, to adhere 
to a set of standards regarding the way personal information is collected, disclosed and used, as 
well as providing for access and amendment rights to individuals.  Meanwhile at the State level, 
the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) includes the Information 
Protection Principles that provides for similar obligations for NSW State Government agencies.   
 
In addition, the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW) governs the handling 
of health information by both public sector agencies and private organisations.  The Act includes 
the 15 Health Privacy Principles that broadly cover the collection, storage, use, access and 
disclosure of health information.  The Act came into effect on 1 September 2004. 
                                                 
31 Gareth Griffith, Privacy Law Reform: Issues and Developments, NSW Parliamentary Library Research 
Service 1998 at p 8. 
32 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6, Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) s 4.  
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Regulation about information privacy is the most comprehensive and regulated of all the sub-
categories of privacy that have been identified. Across the jurisdictions, laws regarding 
information privacy have been largely derived from international precedent.  
 
4 INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
The development of privacy law in Australia is largely a result of directly importing international 
human rights instruments into domestic law by ratification.  As various international human 
rights instruments have enumerated privacy, privacy was therefore anchored in Australia’s legal 
tradition through its obligations under international law.33  
 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ‘ICCPR’) was ratified by Australia 
on 13 August 1980 and entered into force on 13 November 1980. Article 17 of the ICCPR 
provides: 
 
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour or reputation. 
 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.  
 
The ratification of the ICCPR was the first time a right to privacy was introduced into Australia 
with some legal recognition, even though it was not directly incorporated into a Bill of Rights or 
other equivalent statute. 
 
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is an almost identical provision to 
article 17 of the ICCPR and article 16 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child is likewise 
substantially similar, but with specific reference to children. 
 
In 1991, Australia acceded to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR that gives an applicant 
certain rights to bring a case for infringement of one of the rights enumerated under the ICCPR 
to the United National Human Rights Committee.  However, an applicant may only do so in 
certain situations and where all available domestic remedies have been exhausted.34 
 
In addition to the ICCPR, privacy rights were given further depth and definition with the 
development of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Guidelines on 
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.  These Guidelines provide 
that OECD member countries should adopt ‘Basic Principles of National Application’ that 
provides the way personal information about an individual is collected, used, disclosed and 
stored as well as providing a general right of access by individuals to their personal information 
and a right to have the information amended.35 These guidelines were developed to strike an 
                                                 
33 There has been lengthy discussion about whether privacy is a ‘human right’ or an ‘interest’, for example 
see Carolyn Doyle & Mirko Bagaric, Privacy Law in Australia, The Federation Press 2005.  
34 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966, entered into force in Australia 25 September 1991, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/5.htm accessed on 29 April 2008.  
35 The OECD Guidelines are available at http://www.oecd.org.  
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appropriate balance between ensuring privacy is protected and facilitating the free flow of 
information.36 
 
The preamble to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (‘Privacy Act’) specifically refers to both the ICCPR 
and the OECD Guidelines and the Act itself gives effect to the OECD Guidelines and partial 
effect to the ICCPR.37  
 
There are some significant differences between the ICCPR and the OECD Guidelines, the most 
notable of which is that the ICCPR has treaty status and is expressed in broad, abstract language. 
The OECD Guidelines, meanwhile, do not have treaty status and are expressed in specific 
terms.38 Also, the OECD Guidelines relate almost exclusively to ‘information privacy’ whereas 
the ICCPR also refers to privacy generally.  
 
The last International instrument that had some bearing on the development of information 
privacy law in Australia was the European Union’s (EU) Directive on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC).  This directive was issued in 1995 to ensure that the 
citizens of the EU do not lose privacy protections when their personal data is transferred outside 
of EU member countries.  Specifically, article 25 of the EU Directive restricts disclosures of 
personal data from EU states to external jurisdictions which did not have an adequate level of 
legal protection for such data.  This measure increased pressure for those jurisdictions that did 
not have adequate privacy protections to bring their privacy laws into line with evolving 
international standards.  The EU’s Directive had some indirect influence on the broadening of 
Australia’s privacy law to cover parts of the private sector and the State Government sector.39 
 
5 PRIVACY LAW IN AUSTRALIA 
 
The Australian Constitution does not provide a conclusive view about which jurisdiction, State / 
Territory or Federal, is responsible for privacy regulation.  As such, each State and Territory, 
together with the Commonwealth, is able to enact relevant legislation.  
 
As such, privacy law in Australia has been established by several statute-based regulatory 
regimes that handle ‘information privacy’.  In New South Wales and at the Commonwealth level, 
there are separate Acts concerned with information privacy.  Each of the other States and the 
Northern Territory have either legislative or administrative arrangements in place with respect to 
the regulation of personal information management.  
 
The principal federal statute that handles information privacy is the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) 
(‘Privacy Act’).  The Privacy Act provides for a Commission to regulate the way in which those 
organisations within its remit handle personal information, rather than providing a tort of privacy 
                                                 
36 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Australian Privacy Law – Discussion Paper 72, 
September 2007 at p 545. 
37 Office of the Privacy Commissioner, The operation of the Privacy Act annual report: 1 July 2006 – 30 
June 2007 at p 81.  
38 Margaret Jackson, Hughes on Data Protection in Australia, Lawbook Co 2001 at p 25.  
39 International Privacy Standards, Privacy Victoria, 30 June 2003.  
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generating a right to a cause of action at civil law.  
 
The Privacy Act was initiated in 1988 in the aftermath of the Hawke Government’s attempts to 
introduce an ‘Australia Card’.  In 1985, the Hawke Government floated the possibility of a 
national identification scheme.  The intention of the project was that the Government would issue 
a card – dubbed the ‘Australia Card’ – to every individual for the purposes of combating tax 
evasion, welfare fraud and illegal immigration.40 
 
The elements of the scheme were that everyone would receive a unique identifier encoded in a 
card that would be linked to a central register.  This card would be use to access Government 
services and Government agencies would compel production of the card.  As a result of heated 
public debate, opinion polls showing increasing disfavour of such a card and rejection of the 
Card by the Senate (which precipitated a double dissolution election), the Hawke Government 
dropped the proposal.41 
 
The fallout from the Australia Card debate together with international trends and obligations 
prompted the Hawke Government to enact privacy legislation and establish the Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner.  
 
Initially, the Privacy Act provided obligations only for Commonwealth Government departments 
and agencies.  These obligations are set out in the Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) in 
section 14 of the Privacy Act. The IPPs set out the requirements for the manner and method in 
which Commonwealth public sector agencies collect, use, disclose and store personal 
information.  The IPPs also set out requirements to allow individuals to have access to their 
personal information and require agencies to set out policies on how they handle personal 
information.  Separate to the IPPs, the Privacy Act also regulates the use of Tax File Numbers 
(TFNs).  
 
In 1990, coverage of the Privacy Act was extended to include consumer credit reporting.  In 
particular, the Act included specific provisions for consumer credit providers and consumer 
credit reporting agencies on the nature of credit reports and overall creditworthiness of 
individuals.  
 
In 2001, coverage of the Privacy Act was extended to include parts of the private sector, 
including businesses with an annual turnover of more than $3 million, health service providers, 
businesses that trade in personal information for a benefit, service or advantage, subsidiary 
groups of larger organisations and small businesses that opt into coverage of the Act or 
recognised code.  The National Privacy Principles (NPPs), which are distinct from the IPPs, were 
included in Schedule 3 of the Privacy Act to apply to those parts of the private sector covered by 
the Act.  The NPPs draw on the IPPs but expand on them and include several additional 
provisions. These additional provisions reflect changes in the privacy landscape. They prohibit 
the use of Government identifiers as a de facto identification system in the private sector, allow 
for anonymity when dealing with organisations in certain situations, regulate the use of personal 
                                                 
40 Graham Greenleaf, The Australia Card: Towards a National Surveillance System at 
http://austlii.edu.au/itlaw/articles/GGozcard.html, accessed 1 May 2008.  
41 Roger Clarke, Just Another Piece of Plastic in your Wallet: The ‘Australia Card’ Scheme at 
http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/OzCard.html, accessed 1 May 2008.  
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data being transferred offshore and provide additional protections for information deemed 
‘sensitive’.  
 
Administration of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) is the responsibility of the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner.  It has responsibilities for handling complaints and investigating alleged breaches 
of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) by Commonwealth Government agencies and those private sector 
organisations that fall under its jurisdiction.   
 
Although a Federal Act with responsibilities at the Federal level, the Privacy Act 1988 is 
applicable in New South Wales through its coverage of some private sector organisations.  
During debates in New South Wales on whether or not to extend coverage of the Privacy and 
Personal Information Protection Act 1998 to cover the private sector, one of the arguments in 
favour of extending the application was that the Commonwealth Government had, until that time, 
not enacted privacy legislation that covered the private sector.  It was decided that a uniform and 
holistic approach was more appropriate and the issue of private sector coverage was informally 
referred to the Commonwealth Government.42  Amendments to the Privacy Act 1998 in 2001 
partially covered the field with respect to the private sector.  
 
6 THE HISTORY OF PRIVACY LAW IN NSW 
 
In 1972, the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General commissioned a report on privacy.  In 
1973, the Morrison Report was delivered to the then Justice Minister, the Hon. J Maddison, in 
which it recommended that there should be a: 
 
general legislative provision for the protection of privacy of the individual against threats 
existing and foreseeable.43  
 
New South Wales was then the first State to enact a version of a privacy regime with the passing 
of the Privacy Committee Act 1975 (NSW).  This Committee was established to provide for a 
‘privacy ombudsman’.  The Privacy Committee had a largely advisory and investigatory role in 
the management and monitoring of privacy issues in NSW and did not have any effective powers 
to enforce privacy principles in either the public or private sectors.44  Its powers were largely 
limited to undertaking research into matters that affected the privacy of an individual, 
investigating complaints, undertaking educational tasks and drafting reports and 
recommendations that related to possible legislative and administrative initiatives to better 
protect the privacy of individuals.  The Committee also had the power to compel production of 
information or documents, with the failure to comply deemed a criminal offence.  Throughout 
the 1980s, the Committee agitated for legislative reform and the establishment a principle-based 
privacy code.45  
 
                                                 
42 The Hon. J. W. Shaw in NSWPD, 17 September 1998 at p 7601. 
43 Privacy NSW, Submission to the Review of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998, 
24 June 2004 at p 14. 
44 Vicki Mullen, The individuals right to privacy: Protection of personal information in NSW, NSW 
Parliamentary Library, Briefing Paper No 14/95 at pp 8 – 9. 
45 Margaret Jackson, Hughes on Data Protection in Australia, Lawbook Co, 2001 at pp 170 – 172.  
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In 1991, Andrew Tink MP introduced a private member’s Bill, the Data Protection Bill, which 
provided for information privacy protections in both the public and private sectors.  Debate on 
the legislation was deferred until after the release of an Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (‘ICAC’) enquiry that was in the process of drafting a report into the unauthorised 
trade of personal information amongst Government agencies.  
 
In 1992, this ICAC investigation uncovered a network of Government officers selling  to other 
Government agency officers the personal information of individuals that they had access to. This 
network was dubbed the ‘Information Exchange Club’.  In its report, ICAC found that: 
 
an uncontrolled system of exchange of information developed, in which access to 
information depended on the unofficial private contacts a person had. 
  
Unauthorised dissemination of confidential Government information resulted.  The 
Information Exchange Club became a source of information, both for those who sought it 
for what they regarded as a legitimate purpose, and for others who wanted it for re-sale.46 
 
ICAC also uncovered a trade in information from Government agencies to insurance companies 
and financial institutions.  Often, the trade resulted in a cash payment.  In light of the flourishing 
trade in personal information, ICAC supported moves by the Government of the day to pass data 
protection legislation that protected personal information held by State Government agencies 
from misuse47 and addressed the inadequacies in the legislative arrangements of the time in 
dealing with the abuse of personal information.  
 
Specifically, ICAC recommended that the development of a privacy regime was a necessary 
precondition to rebuilding public trust in Government: 
 
efficient data security and protection, and ... a consistent and effective body of law to 
control the handling of confidential government information…are necessary to overcome 
the corrupt trade that has developed.48  
 
ICAC also recommended that access to protected information be strictly limited, that 
unauthorised dealing in Government information be rendered a criminal offence and that 
attempts should be made to have legislation adopted throughout the Commonwealth that is at 
least consistent, if not uniform.  
 
The Privacy Committee added weight to ICAC’s recommendation, noting that: 
 
Personal information provided in good faith (and, frequently, under legal compulsion) by 
the citizens of New South Wales is being bartered and sold on a breathtaking scale.  Our 
                                                 
46 Independent Commission Against Corruption, Report on the unauthorised release of Government 
information: Volume I, August 1992 at pp 13 – 14.  
47 Independent Commission Against Corruption, Report on the unauthorised release of Government 
information: Volume I, August 1992 at p 117. 
48  Independent Commission Against Corruption, Report on the unauthorised release of Government 
information: Volume I, August 1992 at p 120. 
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privacy is being sold and the proceeds of the sale are lining the pockets of the corrupt.49 
 
In 1994, the Privacy and Data Protection Bill 1994, amended from the initial Bill, was 
introduced by the then Attorney General, the Hon. JP Hannaford MLC.  The Bill was referred to 
a Select Committee of the Legislative Council for review.  However, before the Committee was 
able to table a report, the Bill lapsed and there was a change of Government following the March 
1995 State election.  
 
The new Attorney- General, the Hon. JW Shaw QC, MLC, introduced a revamped privacy bill – 
the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Bill 1988 – into Parliament.  The Attorney- 
General noted the significant influence the ICAC report had in creating a more comprehensive  
privacy regime in his Second Reading Speech to Parliament.50 
 
The Bill introduced Information Protection Principles to the public sector in New South Wales, 
preferring to leave coverage of the private sector until a uniform approach on a national basis 
could be devised.51   
 
There was also much debate about whether State Owned Corporations should be included in the 
Act.  Initially, they were excluded but the Opposition moved an amendment in the Legislative 
Council to include them. This amendment was then overturned in the Legislative Assembly due 
to the concern that State Owned Corporations, which competed for business in the private sector, 
would be put at a  ‘competitive disadvantage’ if they had to adhere to obligations not required of 
their counterparts in the private sector.52 
 
After much debate and amendment, the Bill was enacted on 1 December 1998. 
 
7 THE PRIVACY AND PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION ACT 1988 
 
The Privacy and Personal Information Protection 1988 (NSW) is the primary statute that pertain 
to personal information privacy.  The Act applies to New South Wales public sector agencies, 
including local government authorities, the teaching service and NSW Police Force, although 
there are also numerous exemptions, specifically for law enforcement agencies and state-owned 
corporations.53  Health information in the New South Wales public sector is separately handled 
by the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 1988 (NSW).  
 
7.1 The Information Protection Principles  
 
The Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act contains the Information Protection 
                                                 
49 The Privacy Committee of New South Wales, Privacy and data protection in New South Wales, a 
proposal for legislation, Submission to the Independent Commission Against Corruption, No 63 June 1991 
at p. 1 
50 The Hon. J.W. Shaw in NSWPD, 17 September 1998 at p 7600. 
51 Ibid at p 7601.  
52 The Hon. Paul Whelan MP in NSWPD, 18 November 2008 at p 10276. 
53 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) s 3 
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Principles.  As with most legislation concerning data protection, the principles are based on the 
1980 OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data and as such are structurally similar (but contents-wise, different) to the equivalent 
Information Privacy Principles in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).  
 
The principles of the Act are set out in sections 8 to 19 and broadly deal with the following: 
 
8.  Collection of personal information for lawful purposes: An agency must not collect 
personal information unless it is for a lawful purpose directly related to the functions of 
the agency and the information is reasonably necessary for that purpose. 
 
9. Collection of personal information directly from the individual: An agency must collect 
information about an individual directly from the individual concerned unless the 
individual authorises the agency to collect from other sources or, in the case individuals 
under 16 years of age, the information has been provided by a parent or guardian. 
 
10. Requirements when collecting personal information: In the process of collecting personal 
information, an agency needs to ensure that it gives notice to the individual that 
information is being collected, make the individual aware of the purpose of the 
collection, to whom the information will be forwarded to, whether the collection of 
information is required or authorised by law, any access and correction rights that may 
apply, and the agency’s contact details. 
 
11. Other requirements relating to collection of personal information: In the process of 
collecting personal information, an agency needs to ensure that the information collected 
is relevant to its purpose, is accurate and does not unreasonably intrude into the personal 
affairs of the individual. 
 
12. Retention and security of personal information: An agency must not keep information for 
longer than is necessary for the purposes for which it may be lawfully used, the 
information must be stored securely, must be disposed of securely and reasonable steps 
must be taken to ensure the information is not used or disclosed without authorisation.  
 
13. Information about personal information held by agencies: An agency must take 
reasonable steps to enable an individual to ascertain whether the agency holds 
information about them, the nature of the information that the agency holds, the purpose 
for which the information is used, and how the individual can access the information.  
 
14. Access to personal information held by agencies: An agency must provide individuals 
with access to their personal information, upon request by the individual.  
 
15. Alteration of personal information: An agency must permit an individual to check the 
accuracy and relevance of information and, if information is amended, notify the 
individual of the amendment.  If the agency is not prepared to amend the record, the 
agency must allow the individual to provide a statement on the record about the 
amendment sought.   
 
16. Agency must check accuracy of personal information before use:  An agency must take 
reasonable steps to ensure that the information it holds about an individual is accurate, 
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complete and up to date, before using the information.  
 
17. Limits on use of personal information:  An agency must not use personal information for 
a use other than the use for which it was collected, unless the individual to whom the 
information relates to consents to the use, or the use is directly related to the use for 
which it was collected, or the use of the information for the other purpose is necessary to 
prevent or lessen serious or imminent harm. 
 
18. Limits on disclosure of personal information: An agency must not disclose personal 
information unless than disclosure is directly related to the purpose for which the 
information was collected, or the individual about who it relates to is reasonably likely to 
be aware that the information would be disclosed, or the information needs to be 
disclosed because of a serious and imminent threat to an individual.  
 
19. Special restrictions on disclosure of personal information:  An agency must not disclose 
sensitive information about an individual – such as ethnic origin, political opinions, 
religious beliefs, sexual orientation etc – unless it does so to prevent a serious and 
imminent threat to the life of an individual.  An agency is also prohibited from 
transferring data to jurisdictions that do not have relevant a privacy law or privacy code.  
 
Section 8 – 11 do not apply to personal information collected by an agency before the 
commencement of the Act although the remaining principles apply to personal information 
collected by agencies regardless if the information was collected before or after the 
commencement of the Act.  
 
The principles frequently refer to ‘personal information’ and the primary purpose of the Act is to 
protect the integrity of ‘personal information’.  Personal information is defined in section 4 of the 
Act as: 
  
Information or an opinion (including information or an opinion forming part of a 
database and whether or not recorded in a material form) about an individual whose 
identity is apparent or can reasonably be ascertained from the information or opinion.54   
 
The Act expressly provides that personal information can also include biometric data, such as 
fingerprints, retina prints, body samples or genetic characteristics.55  However, health 
information is expressly excluded from the definition of personal information as it is separately 
dealt with by the Health Information and Privacy Records Act 1992.56  
                                                 
54 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1988 (NSW) s 4(1)  
55 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1988 (NSW) s 4(2) 
56 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1988 (NSW) s 4A 
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7.2 Exemptions 
 
The definition of personal information also contains a comprehensive list of exemptions.  For 
example, personal information does not include information relating to an individual who has 
been deceased for more than 30 years57 and information about an individual that is contained in a 
publicly available record.58  
 
The extensive, although non-exhaustive, list of exclusions also include: 
 
• information about a witness who is included in a witness protection program under the 
Witness Protection Act 1995; 
 
• information about an individual arising out of a warrant under the Telecommunications 
(Interception) Act  1979 of the Commonwealth; 
 
• information about an individual arising out of a protected disclosure in accordance with 
the Protected Disclosures Act 1994;  
 
• information about an individual arising out of, or in connection with, a law enforcement 
operation in accordance with the Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997; 
and 
 
• Information arising out of a Royal Commission or Special Commission of Inquiry. 
 
The list is long and doubts have been raised as to whether there are strong enough reasons to 
warrant so many exclusions.59   
 
There are numerous other provisions that provide for specific agencies to be exempt from some, 
or all of the principles of the Act.  For example, ICAC and the NSW Police Service are 
specifically exempted from adhering to part of the Information Protection Principles of the Act 
except in relation to their administrate functions.60   
 
Meanwhile sections 24 and 25 of the Act provide for partial exemptions for law enforcement and 
investigatory agencies in certain circumstances.  For example, under section 23(4) of the Act, a 
public sector agency is not required to comply with the principle that limits the use of personal 
information if the use of the information concerned a purpose other than the purpose for which it 
was collected, is reasonably necessary for law enforcement purposes or for the protection of the 
public revenue.  The creation of partial exemptions from the principles for some agencies in 
                                                 
57 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1988 (NSW) s 4(3)(a).  Note the difference with the s 6 
of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) that defines that personal information only applies to ‘natural persons’, that 
is, individuals that are living.  
58 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1988 (NSW) s 4(3)(b) 
59 Moira Paterson, Freedom of Information and Privacy in Australia: Government and Information Access 
in the Modern State, LexisNexis Butterworths 2005 at p 73. 
60 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) s 27 
Privacy: The Current Situation 
 
17 
certain circumstances has attracted criticism for its confusing nature and the difficulty in 
applying the law consistently. 61  
 
Section 5 of the Act also provides that the operation of the Privacy and Personal Information 
Protection Act 1998 does not affect the operation of the Freedom of Information Act 1989 while 
section 20(5) provides that certain protection principles (regarding Information about personal 
information held by agencies, Access to personal information held by agencies and Alteration of 
personal information) do not affect any condition or limitation arising out of the Freedom of 
Information Act 1989.  
  
7.3 Privacy Codes of Practice 
 
The Act also allows for a Government agency to modify the IPPs through the application of a 
code of practice.  The Privacy Commissioner or a public sector agency may initiate the 
preparation of a draft privacy code which may modify the application of the IPPs to a public 
sector agency or may exempt the agency, or class of agency, from compliance with an IPP.62  
The Privacy Commissioner may submit the draft code to the Minister along with any 
submissions that the Privacy Commissioner thinks appropriate.63  The code takes effect by an 
order of the Minister published in the Gazette.64  
 
7.4 Management Plans 
 
Each public sector agency was required to devise a privacy management plan and lodge the plan 
with the Privacy Commissioner by 1 July 2000.  Privacy management plans are strategic 
documents where the public sector agency describes the measures in place to ensure compliance 
with the information protection principles and the public register provisions of the Act.  The 
plans may be amended, as the agency deems appropriate.  
 
7.5 The Commissioner and the Complaints Process 
 
Section 36 of the Act provides a lengthy list of functions conferred onto the Privacy 
Commissioner.   
 
A list of some of the functions is as follows: 
 
• to promote the adoption of, and monitor compliance with, the information protection 
principles.65 
 
• to provide assistance to public sector agencies in adopting and complying with the 
                                                 
61 Privacy NSW, Submission on the Review of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998, 
June 2004 at p 32.  
62 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) ss 30(1) and 30(2)(a) – (c)  
63 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) ss 31(1) and 31(3)  
64 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) s 31(5) 
65 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) s 36(2)(a) 
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information protection principles and privacy codes of practice.66 
 
• to conduct research, and collect and collate information, about any matter relating to the 
protection of personal information and the privacy of individuals.67 
 
• to conduct education programs, and to disseminate information, for the purpose of 
promoting the protection of the privacy of individuals.68 
 
• to prepare and publish reports and recommendations about any matter (including 
developments in technology) that concerns the need for, or the desirability of, legislative, 
administrative or other action in the interest of the privacy of individuals.69 
 
Another one of the functions of the Privacy Commissioner is to receive complaints about the 
violation or interference with an individual’s privacy and, where appropriate, undertake 
preliminary assessment and investigations into the matter with a view to conciliating the 
complaint between the disputing parties.70 
 
Generally, a privacy complaint must be made within six months of the affected individual being 
made aware of the matter that is the subject of the complaint.  The Privacy Commissioner may 
make preliminary assessments of the subject of the complaint for the purpose of deciding 
whether to deal with the complaint.  Regard may be given to whether the complaint is frivolous, 
vexatious, lacking in substance, trivial or where there are other remedies that may be more 
appropriate in the circumstances.  
 
7.6 Internal Reviews 
 
The Commissioner may assist a named agency in conducting an internal review.  Section 53(1) 
of the Act provides that an applicant who is aggrieved by the conduct of a public sector agency is 
entitled to a review of that conduct.  After completion of the internal review, the agency is able 
to do any number of things, including, take no further action, issuing an apology, remedial action 
such as monetary compensation, an undertaking that the offensive conduct will not recur and 
implementing administrative arrangements to ensure the offensive conduct will not recur.  
 
The agency must notify the Privacy Commissioner that a request for an internal review has been 
received and keep the Privacy Commissioner informed of the progress and findings of the 
review.  
 
If the applicant is dissatisfied with the findings of the review, or dissatisfied with the conduct of 
the agency in the course of its review, then the applicant can appeal to the Administrative 
Review Tribunal.  The Tribunal can issue orders that require an agency to refrain from certain 
                                                 
66 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) s 36(2)(d) 
67 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) s 36(2)(f) 
68 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) s 36(2)(i) 
69 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) s 36(2)(j) 
70 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) s 36(2)(k)-(l)  
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conduct, perform an obligation and take steps to remedy the loss or damage caused to the 
applicant.  In circumstances where the conduct of the agency has resulted in financial loss or 
physical or psychological harm, the Tribunal can award damages up to $40,000.  
 
7.7 Offences under the Act 
 
The Act also criminalises corrupt disclosures of personal information.  Section 62 and 63 of the 
Act provide that a person who intentionally discloses personal information outside of the course 
of their duties, or attempts to induce a bribe for the supply of personal information or solicits a 
bribe in exchange for personal information, can be deemed guilty of a criminal offence that 
carries up to two years imprisonment.  Section 62(3) does however provide an exception for 
whistleblowers, which ensures that public servants are not prohibited from disclosing personal 
information in circumstances that are in accordance with the Protected Disclosures Act 1994.  
The Act also provides for offences relating to the wilful obstruction of the Privacy Commissioner 
in the exercise of his or her functions and making false or misleading statements to the Privacy 
Commissioner.71 
 
7.8 The Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 
 
In December 2000, the NSW Ministerial Advisory Committee on Privacy and Health 
Information released its report Panacea or Placebo? in which it recommended that ‘the system 
of linked electronic health records be governed by a separate and specific piece of State 
legislation’72. Subsequently, the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW) was 
enacted which includes the Health Privacy Principles (HPPs).  These principles were modelled 
on the NPPs of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and designed to build on existing obligations required 
of health service providers.73  While the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) covers private sector health 
service providers and the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) covers 
State public sector health service providers, the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 
2002 (NSW) provides an additional layer of obligations on health service providers at both the 
private and State public level.74  
 
The HPPs apply to all organisations that hold health information defined as information or an 
opinion about a person’s physical or mental health or a disability of an individual.75  The HPPs 
do not apply to information held by individuals in relation to their household affairs, news media 
outlets, group practices or certain statutory authorities.76  Many of the HPPs are mere 
restatements of existing privacy principles in both the State IPPs and the Federal NPPs.  
However, the Act contains additional provisions to the HPPs that are more prescriptive and assist 
in the operation of the HPPs.  For example, while section 14 of the Privacy and Personal 
                                                 
71 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) s 68 
72 Gareth Griffith, Information Privacy and Health Records, NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service, 
April 2002 at p 30.  
73 Ibid at p 31.  
74 Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW), s 11 
75 Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW), s 6  
76 Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW), ss 14 – 17  
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Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) and NPP 6 in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) respectively 
requires an agency or organisation to provide access to health information on request by the 
individual concerned, neither principle stipulates a deadline for providing access.  The Health 
Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW), meanwhile, provides for a general right of 
access at HPP 7 but, additionally, stipulates a limit of 45 days for health service providers to 
allow access or a statement explaining the reasons for refusal to allow access.77  To this end, the 
Health Records and Information Act 2002 (NSW) provides more guidance for compliance with 
the principles of the Health Records and Information Act 2002 (NSW) than either the Privacy 
Act 1988 (Cth) or the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW).  
Complaints about alleged breaches of the Health Records and Information Act 2002 (NSW) are 
the responsibility of the Privacy Commissioner.    
 
The HPPs also include an additional principle regarding the linkage of health records.  This 
principle provides that, generally, an organisation must not include the health information of an 
individual on a health records linkage system unless the individual has the expressly consented to 
the information being included on such a system.78  This principle is notably absent from the 
State IPPs as well as both the Federal IPPs and NPPs.  
 
8 PRIVACY AT THE COMMON LAW  
 
While there is a suite of developed legislation that, in some way, touches on privacy law, the 
development of privacy at the common law is nascent.   
 
In Australia, historically, the common law has largely refused to recognise an actionable right to 
privacy.79 However, the question of whether privacy exists as a common law right, or should 
exist as a right, has been the subject of judicial consideration in a number of cases.  
 
For six decades, the law on privacy was primarily drawn from the High Court’s judgement in 
Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor in which Latham CJ said in 
considering the arguments raised in favour of finding a tort of privacy:  
 
However desirable some limitation upon the invasions of privacy might be, no authority 
was cited which shows that any general right of privacy exists.80 
 
The position of the common law on the question of privacy remained unaltered and largely 
uncontested, and the experience for the ensuing six decades was that the position of the Court in 
Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor was settled law.  
 
Musings about the development of a tort of privacy developed in the intermittent years. In 
Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward, Murphy J identified ‘an unjustified invasion of privacy’ 
                                                 
77 Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW), s 27 
78 Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW), HPP 15 
79 See Carolyn Doyle & Mirko Bagaric, Privacy Law in Australia, The Federation Press 2005 at p 59. 
80 Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (‘Victoria Park Racing’)  (1937) 58 CLR, 
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as a ‘developing tort’81but did not elaborate on or progress the thought.    
 
The issue was properly reignited in the recent case of Australian Broadcasting Corporation v 
Lenah Meats Pty Ltd.  
 
In this case, Lenah Game Meats, the respondent, was a processor and supplier of possum meat.  
Individuals unknown to the respondent broke into the factory premises and covertly filmed the 
stunning and killing of possums for the production of its meat.  The film of the incident was then 
passed on to the applicants, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (‘ABC’).  Lenah Game Meats 
then sought an interim injunction for the broadcasting of the film citing, inter alia, a right to 
privacy. 
 
In considering the facts, Gleeson CJ noted: 
 
The respondent invited this Court to depart from old authority, declare that Australian 
law now recognises a tort of invasion of privacy; hold that it is available to be relied 
upon by corporations as well as individuals; and conclude that this is the missing cause 
of action for which everyone in the case has so far been searching.82 
 
Despite refusing to recognise a tort of privacy in the circumstances of the case before the Court, 
Gleeson CJ did not close the door to recognising a tort of privacy all together.  Specific to his 
concerns in Lenah Game Meats was that the applicant, a company, was asking for a recognition 
of its corporate privacy, noting that: 
 
Lenah’s reliance upon an emergent tort of invasion of privacy is misplaced.  Whatever 
development may take place in that field will be to the benefit of natural, not artificial, 
persons.83 
 
Gleeson CJ continued:  
 
Nothing said in these reasons should be understood as foreclosing any such debate or as 
indicating any particular outcome.  Nor, as already has been pointed out, should the 
decision in Victoria Park.84 
 
The Court emphasised that its decision not to recognise a right of privacy for Lenah Game 
Meat’s should not be interpreted as the Court precluding the existence of such a right, for natural 
persons, in future cases.85  
 
                                                 
81 Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25, [13] 
82 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (‘Lenah Game Meats’) (2001) 208 
CLR 199, [38] 
83 Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, [132] 
84 Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, [132] 
85 See Ken McKinnon, ‘Privacy and the Press’, Speech to the Commonwealth Press Union Conference on 
25 February 2005 at http://www.presscouncil.org.au/pcsite/fop/cpu.html, accessed 30 April 2008. 
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Meanwhile, Callinan J compared the decision of the Court in Lenah Game Meats with that of 
Victoria Park Racing, noting that the decision of the Court in Victoria Park Racing was by a 
‘narrow majority’86 and had ‘the appearance of an anachronism’.87  In dicta, Callinan J advised:   
 
It seems to me that, having regard to current conditions in this country, and developments 
of the law in other common law jurisdictions, the time is ripe for consideration whether a 
tort of invasion of privacy should be recognised in this country… 88 
 
The door for an actionable right of privacy in Australia was left ajar, examined further in the case 
of Grosse v Purvis. 
 
In Grosse v Purvis, the plaintiff alleged that she had suffered psychological harm as a result of 
the defendant persistently harassing her. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had loitered 
around her residence and workplace, had trespassed on her residential premises and had made 
nuisance phone calls.  
 
In the case, Senior Judge Skoien noted Gleeson CJ’s view in Lenah Game Meats that the 
decision in Victoria Park Racing presented ‘no bar to the existence of a common law right to 
privacy’89 and then proceeded to take, what in his Honour’s words was, ‘a bold step’90 and ‘as it 
seems, the first step in this country’91 to unequivocally recognise an actionable right of privacy.  
 
In identifying this right of privacy, his Honour then enumerated a four-pronged test detailing 
each of the essential elements of the new tort. They included: 
 
(a) a willed act by the defendant, 
 
(b) which intrudes upon the privacy or seclusion of the plaintiff, 
 
(c) in a manner which would be considered highly offensive to a reasonable person 
of ordinary sensibilities, and 
 
(d) which causes the plaintiff detriment in the form of mental, psychological, 
emotional harm or distress or which prevents or hinders the plaintiff from doing 
an act which s/he is lawfully entitled to do.92 
 
His Honour found that each element of the test was satisfied by the plaintiff in Grosse v Purvis 
and subsequently awarded damages to the plaintiff totalling $178,000, including $20,000 in 
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exemplary damages.93  
 
A second noteworthy case in the development of the tort of privacy is Jane Doe v Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation.  In this case, the defendant – a media broadcaster – published 
information that identified the victim of a sexual crime.  
 
In her judgement, Judge Hampel acknowledged the existence of an actionable right of privacy, 
referring to the essential elements of the tort enumerated in Grosse v Purvis, and took, in her 
Honour’s words, the next ‘incremental step in the development of the recognition of the right to 
protection against, provide remedy for, breach of privacy’. 94 
 
Her Honour subsequently found that the defendant had breached the plaintiff’s privacy by 
unjustifiably publishing personal information about the plaintiff and was therefore liable for 
damages.  
 
The precedential value of the decisions in Grosse v Purvis and Jane Doe v ABC is still largely 
unknown given not only the relative recency of these decisions but also the fact that they were 
handed down in Courts that are limited in their ability to bind other courts.  To this end, whether 
a tort of privacy develops beyond its infancy is contingent on its acceptance by superior courts.   
 
To date, however, the prognosis is not encouraging.  In Giller v Procopets, the defendant 
videotaped himself having sexual relations with his then partner, without her knowledge.  The 
defendant subsequently distributed copies of the video to his friends.  The plaintiff brought 
causes of action including, inter alia, an invasion of privacy.  Gillard J of the Supreme Court of 
Victoria rejected the privacy claim finding that, whilst a cause of action in privacy is in a 
‘process of development’95, it has not ‘developed to a point where the law in Australia recognises 
an action for breach of privacy’.96 
 
Similarly, in Milne v Haynes, Latham J of the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that 
‘there is, as yet, no recognition in the courts of this state of a tort of breach of privacy’.97  
 
In Kalaba v Commonwealth of Australia, the Federal Court upheld a decision by the primary 
Judge in refusing to recognise that the applicant’s privacy was interfered with but added that 
there was the ‘possibility of an argument that Australian law should recognise a duty of privacy, 
provided that there were circumstances in which such an argument could reasonably be raised’.98 
 
The experience thus far is that while Courts across the nation are open to the possibility that an 
actionable right to privacy should exist, or even might exist in the right circumstances, many 
                                                 
93 Grosse v Purvis [2003] QDC 151, [483] 
94 Jane Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2007] VCC 281,  [162]  
95 Giller v Procopets [2004] VSC 113, [187] 
96 Giller v Procopets [2004] VSC 113, [188] 
97 Milne v Hayes [2005] NSWSC 1107, [19]  
98 Kalaba v Commonwealth of Australia [2004] FCA 763, [8] 
Privacy: The Current Situation 
 
24  
courts do not feel that Australian jurisprudence has evolved to the point where it can be stated 
definitively that a right does exist.  The experience in Grosse v Purvis and Jane Doe v ABC are 
therefore the exceptions rather than the rule.  
 
Assuming that a tort of privacy does exist, then the next question that requires elucidation is, 
what are the elements of this tort?  Senior Judge Skoien went some way in Grosse v Purvis to 
provide a test that was adopted by Judge Hampel in Jane Doe v ABC.   However, Senior Judge 
Skoien did not define the limits of a tort of privacy, nor did he exhaustively enumerate a list of 
defences to the tort.  Judge Hampel’s contribution to developing the tort of privacy was also 
limited, preferring to take an incremental approach.  Judge Hampel refrained from deliberating 
on what a tort of privacy necessarily entails, having recognised its inherently imprecise nature 
and the difficulties in establishing an exhaustive definition.99  In this regard, the tort of privacy in 
Australia remains a nascent concept, both in terms of its development (a fact acknowledged by 
the very Courts that gave the tort its legs) and in terms of its adoption (having only been 
recognised in certain situations and by relatively junior Courts).  
 
From this experience, it appears that some time may pass before an authoritative judicial view, 
with far-reaching precedential value, will be established on whether a tort of privacy definitely 
exists in Australia.100  
 
8.1 The New Zealand Experience 
 
As a tort of privacy has not fully matured in Australia, it may be of value to refer to other 
jurisdictions to ascertain an understanding of the development elsewhere.  
 
In New Zealand, the signature case is that of Hosking v Runting.  The facts of the case are that 
the respondent took photographs of the appellant’s infant children on a public footpath, without 
the plaintiff’s consent. The majority of the Court of Appeal found a privacy tort exists at 
common law.  The elements of the tort were twofold: 
 
a) The existence of facts in which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy; and 
 
b) Publicity given to those private facts that would be considered highly (or 
significantly) offensive to an objective reasonable person. 
 
 Tipping J asserted that it was: 
 
legally preferable and better for society’s understanding of what the Courts are doing to 
achieve the appropriate substantive outcome under a self contained and stand-alone 
common law cause of action to be known as invasion of privacy.101 
 
The Court held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy as the photographs were 
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taken from a public venue and that a person of ordinary sensibilities would not find the conduct 
highly offensive or objectionable.  The Court then proceeded to dismiss the plaintiffs’ appeal, as 
they had not demonstrated that they had met the elements of the tort.  
 
Despite the substantial legal precedent that the Court established, the Court found that the 
plaintiff had failed to meet the burden of passing the test and accordingly, dismissed the appeal.  
 
The case is important as, unlike the Australian experience, the Court did not equivocate about a 
supposed right to privacy but provided a definitive endorsement of its importance and existence. 
 Further, the Court of Appeal was at the time the most senior court in New Zealand.102 By 
contrast, the most senior Courts in Australia are yet to comment about the existence of a tort of 
privacy.  
 
9  A STATUTORY TORT OF PRIVACY?  
 
In May 2007, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC) released a 
consultation paper in which the terms of reference required the Commission to consider the 
desirability of privacy protection principles being uniform and a consistent legislative response 
to privacy law, together with the desirability of introducing a statutory tort of privacy in New 
South Wales. 
 
In the consultation paper, 20 questions were raised together with two proposals, including 
proposal 1: 
 
If a cause of action for invasion of privacy is enacted in New South Wales, the statute 
should identify its objects and purposes and contain a non-exhaustive list of the types of 
invasion that fall within it;103 and 
 
proposal 2: 
  
The statute should provide that where the court finds that there has been an invasion of 
the plaintiff’s privacy, the Court may, in its discretion, grant any one or more of the 
following:  
• damages, including aggravated damages, but not exemplary damages;  
• an account of profits;  
• an injunction;  
• an order requiring the defendant to apologise to the plaintiff;  
• a correction order;  
• an order for the delivery up and destruction of material;  
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• a declaration;  
• other remedies or orders that the Court thinks appropriate in the 
circumstances.104 
If either of the above proposals is adopted, or if some other form of statutory cause of action or 
invasion of privacy is enacted, this would this would offer an authoritative view currently 
lacking at the common law and potentially fill the gaps that exist.  Any new statutory tort would 
possibly be more flexible and fluid in its application than the piecemeal protection currently 
afforded under the various legislative arrangements.105  Work on the NSWLRC’s project is 
continuing. 
 
10 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
In 2004, the Office of the NSW Privacy Commissioner (‘Privacy NSW’) conducted a review of 
the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) to ascertain its strengths and 
weaknesses, together with gauging appropriate reforms.  In its report, Privacy NSW 
recommended comprehensive amendments to the Act and other changes relating to the functions 
of the Office.  
 
It is not the intention of the paper to summarise the report in detail, but a few key issues that 
were raised are worth mentioning.  
 
The report makes numerous recommendations to amend the principles to ensure and clarify that 
the intentions of the principles are met and the report also comments on the ‘missing principles’ 
of anonymity and limiting Government agencies from using unique identifiers.  These two 
principles are found in the NPPs, but not the IPPs, of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).   
 
The report identified the numerous exemptions and exceptions allowed for in the Privacy and 
Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) which had prompted Privacy NSW to create a 
‘matrix’ document of these exemptions on its website.106  The exemptions, together with the 
complex structure of the Act, made it difficult to understand the Act’s application.107  As a result, 
recommendations were made with respect to a restructure of the exemptions provided in the Act 
to either clarify the scope of particular exemptions or delete exemptions in the absence of clear 
policy reasons.108  This would go some way to ironing out some of the problems identified 
regarding the ‘patchwork’ nature of privacy law application.   
 
The report also recommended that the powers of the Commissioner be boosted so the 
Commissioner can accept whistleblower and representative complaints, as well as enabling the 
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Commissioner to handle freedom of information responsibilities.109  The latter suggestion would, 
in effect, create an Information Commissioner with expanded functions.  
 
11 GAPS AND OVERLAPS 
 
The current layout of privacy law in Australia has been invariably described as ‘piecemeal’ and 
‘patchy’110, as well as ‘inconsistent’ and ‘fragmented’.111 Many of the problems with privacy 
regulation have been assessed by numerous reviews by the relevant law reform commissions, 
including a current review by the Australian Law Reform Commission.  
 
Given the absence of a definitive statement in the Australian Constitution about whether the 
Commonwealth Government or State Governments are responsible for privacy law, both 
jurisdictions are able to enact legislation with respect to personal information management.   
 
Section 3 of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) explicitly states that it does not intend to cover the field 
in relation to the protection of personal information.  In effecting this intention, s6C of the 
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) specifically exempts State and Territory authorities from the operation of 
the Act.  In covering the field with respect to State instrumentalities, the States of New South 
Wales and Victoria, together with the Northern Territory, have developed legislative schemes 
overseen by full time Commissioners to regulate personal information management in the 
relevant public sector.   Other States, such as South Australia and Queensland, have adopted 
administrative schemes for the regulation of personal information in their respective public 
sectors to cover the field. 112 The result of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) ceding certain 
responsibilities to the States and Territories has meant that a piecemeal approach to privacy 
protection has eventuated with the multiplicity of legislation subsequently enacted leading to 
both gaps and overlaps in privacy law coverage.   
 
Firstly, there is overlap.  Overlap can arise when two separate Acts that cover the same sector 
duplicate provisions, therefore making the provisions of one of the Acts redundant.  For example, 
the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW) substantially overlaps with the 
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) in relation to management of health information in the private sector.  A 
private GP in New South Wales must simultaneously adhere to the Federal NPPs and State HPPs 
despite a significant degree of common coverage between the two sets of principles.  There is 
also overlap between Freedom of Information and Privacy.  Section 16 of the Freedom of 
Information Act 1989 (NSW) provides for a general right of access to personal files while section 
14 of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) provides for a similar 
right of access.  
 
Overlap also creates tension between legislation in circumstances where there is a requirement 
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under one Act without that requirement being mirrored in the sister legislation.  In one of the 
examples raised above, the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW) specifies 
the form of access that organisations must provide when individuals seek their health 
information, whereas the Privacy Act 1998 (Cth) does not stipulate how access is to be effected.  
In this respect, a GP may be compliant with one Act but be found to be in breach of the other.   
 
Multiple pieces of legislation also lead to fragmentation.  For example, the Information 
Protection Principles apply to the public sector in NSW whilst the Information Privacy Principles 
apply to the public sector federally.  Although both principles ostensibly apply to their relevant 
public sectors, each set of principles is different.  Meanwhile, the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) also 
includes the National Privacy Principles to cover parts of the private sector.  The result is that in 
New South Wales there are three sets of privacy principles covering three different sectors.  
While divergence in the wording between the different sets of principles may simply be a 
distinction without difference, the lack of a consistent definition leads to an overall sense of 
fragmentation. 
 
In its Review of Privacy, the Australian Law Reform Commission found that there was strong 
support for the development of consolidated principles that are nationally consistent.113  In its 
submission to the review, Privacy NSW also agreed that uniform privacy laws developed in a 
cooperative Federal – State framework were highly desirable in creating an integrated national 
privacy regime.114 The nationally consistent laws – referred to as Unified Privacy Principles in 
the Review of Privacy115 – would presumably combine to cover both public sectors, together with 
the private sector.  The UPPs may also be modelled on the current NPPs as they are more 
comprehensive than the IPPs and are framed in language that is more relevant and contemporary. 
  
Despite the combined application of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and the Privacy and Personal 
Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW), there are still regulatory black holes in certain 
situations.  For example, the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) does 
not cover state owned corporations.  As state owned corporations also fall outside the remit of 
the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) unless prescribed by regulation, the result is that state owned 
corporations fall in between the unregulated gap between the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and the 
Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW), effectively rendering these 
entities free from compliance with any privacy standard.  
  
There is also confusion as to whether contracted service providers to State Government agencies 
are covered by the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW).116  Under the 
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), contracted service providers to State Government agencies are exempt 
from the NPPs.117 However, under section 12(d) of the Privacy and Personal Information 
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Protection Act 1998 (NSW), a public sector agency that holds personal information must only 
ensure that, ‘if it is necessary for the information to be given to a person in connection with the 
provision of a service to the agency, everything reasonably within the power of the agency is 
done to prevent unauthorised use or disclosure of the information’. 118   There is ambiguity as to 
the scope and meaning of this provision and it is possible that contracted service providers to 
NSW Government agencies also fall within the unregulated gap between the State and Federal 
Acts.   
 
Businesses that have an annual turnover of less than $3 million are also exempted from the NPPs 
in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and are not covered by the Privacy and Personal Information 
Protection Act 1998 (NSW).   Similarly, private organisations are exempt from Privacy Act1988 
(Cth) compliance insofar as it relates to an employee’s employment relationship.  While the State 
Government is able to legislate to cover the field with respect to small businesses and employee 
records, during the discussion about the development of the Privacy and Personal Information 
Protection Act 1998 (NSW), it was decided that a nationally consistent approach was preferable 
and best left at the discretion of the Federal Government.119 
 
12 NEW AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES  
 
Changes in the privacy landscape have almost always been influenced by technological 
development.  The famous Warren and Brandeis article was prompted by concerns about the use 
of the emerging technology of the time, the instantaneous photograph.120  Later, in the ALRC 
landmark review of privacy in 1983, there was discussion about the emerging possibilities (and 
threats) brought about by what it described as ‘information processing’ and the ‘marriage of the 
computer revolution with telecommunications, the era of computications’.121 
 
Today, concerns about further technological development in the fields of IT, biometrics and 
tracking devices influence discussions about privacy.  In this context, privacy is emerging at the 
leading edge of academic discussion as more people are ascribing added degrees of importance 
to protecting their privacy.  In the fictional TV series The West Wing, the Deputy 
Communications Director, Sam Seaborn, tells the President during a discussion about the 
emerging importance of privacy:  
 
It’s about the next 20 years. Twenties and thirties, it was the role of government. 
Fifties and sixties, it was civil rights. The next two decades, it’s gonna be privacy. 
I’m talking about the Internet. I'm talking about cellphones. I’m talking about health 
records, and who’s gay and who’s not. And moreover, in a country born on a will to 
be free, what could be more fundamental than this? 
 
New technologies are not necessarily destructive of privacy, but misuse of the new technologies 
can have privacy-intrusive consequences that can ‘distort the balancing act between individual 
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privacy and other social needs’.122  Listed below are some examples of current and emerging 
technologies whose use or misuse can be privacy-intrusive and which regulators need to consider 
as the next possible frontier in protecting personal privacy.  
12.1 Biometrics 
 
Biometrics is the umbrella term that describes the biological measurements used to identify or 
authenticate humans.123 Biometric applications essentially work by taking a sample from an 
individual, converting it into a template and storing it on a database.124  Subsequent biometric 
samples from the individual can then be used to identify or verify the individual by matching 
subsequent collections with the stored data.  
 
Examples of biometric applications include capturing fingerprints, retinal and iris scans, analysis 
of hand geometry and ear lobe capillary structures, facial structure and voice recognition.  
Biometrics can also capture both the behavioural and psychological aspects of individuals, such 
as keystroke dynamics, hand writing technique and movement technique.    
 
Biometric applications are not privacy intrusive per se, but have the potential to have a negative 
impact on personal privacy, even if the user is not deliberately attempting to use to the 
application in a privacy-invasive manner.  
 
One concern about biometric technology is that it has the potential to lead to widespread 
surveillance of people given the relative ease in capturing and storing the data, and being able to 
‘match’ the stored data with the relevant subject.125  As biometric information is highly reliable 
and unique, disparate biometric data can easily be consolidated to create comprehensive profiles 
of any one individual. 
 
A second concern is that biometrics can be used to identify people without their knowledge or 
consent.126  The concern emerges from the fact that biometric information is capable of being 
collected covertly, such as capturing a digitised image of someone’s face or through keystroke 
monitoring.   
 
Also, when biometric information is collected, it may result in the collection of more information 
than was intended.  For example, if a person submits to an iris scan for the purposes of 
authenticating the individual, the scan may also unintentionally reveal eye conditions the person 
has if analysed by an iridologist.  Similarly, a voice recording may reveal a person’s emotional 
state.127 Essentially, the human body contains hidden messages embedded in our biometric data 
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which can be revealed through a more detailed analysis of an otherwise innocuous sample.  
 
In Australia, biometric technology is being introduced gradually.  The Australian Government 
has introduced the ‘ePassport’ system that includes, among other things, a digitised facial image 
of the passport holder.  The passport holder is now able to proceed through a ‘smartgate’ that 
uses facial recognition software to verify that the person passing through the gate matches the 
digitised facial image on the passport.  Businesses frequently use biometric applications for 
security purposes, such as accessing secure rooms or logging on to computer programs.  As 
biometrics become more commonplace, the possible threats to privacy also increase.  
 
12.2 Location-Based Technologies 
 
Radio frequency identification (RFID) works by chipping a tag in a product, animal or person for 
the purposes of identification and tracking by emitting radio waves that can be read by a radio 
scanner.  
 
RFID technology is not new and its use in tagging clothes in department stores to prevent theft is 
long established.  If the tagged clothing item is stolen, the RFID reader at the exits detects the 
radio waves being emitted by the RFID tag on the clothing and the match then triggers an alarm. 
 Similarly, tollways use RFID technology to detect passing vehicles fitted with a RFID tag (‘e-
tag’) and deduct the fee from the toll users’ account.  
 
As these two examples demonstrate, RFID technology has many uses and its application has 
been important in minimising loss and theft and maximising speed and efficiency.  However, 
RFID technology can also be used to surreptitiously collect a variety of data.  RFID tags are able 
to transmit data that identifies not only the object to which it is attached, but also such things 
such as its location, price, expiry data, colour, or date of purchase of product.128  RFID tags may 
also be able to transmit data about its surroundings.129 
 
The primary concern about RFID technology is that it may be used covertly to identify 
individuals that buy certain products, for example books or suits.  There have also been reports 
that RFID technology is being employed to locate the whereabouts of individuals, similar to the 
way one can microchip a pet.  Recently, a school in England advised it may begin using RFID 
tags attached on to the uniforms of some of its students to monitor their whereabouts in an 
attempt to rein in truancy rates.130   
 
Also, the advent and popularity of the global positioning system (GPS) has enabled millions of 
people to accurately locate themselves through the use of satellite technology by GPS systems 
either in their cars or phones.  Although ostensibly used for navigational purposes, GPS and its 
location detecting abilities can also be used to surreptitiously collect information about the 
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whereabouts of individuals.  
 
12.3 The Internet 
 
The Internet represents one of the most potent threats against privacy today.  The innate nature of 
IT means that personal data can be accessed, replicated and disclosed anywhere in the world, in a 
matter of seconds.  
 
The huge popularity of personal websites and integrated networking sites, such as Facebook, has 
given privacy on the Internet a new meaning.  Websites like these enable individuals to upload 
information and photographs about themselves and others.  This could be quite privacy intrusive, 
especially if the information or photograph is embarrassing or offensive.  
 
Other privacy issues that relate to the internet include the use of spyware, a software that enables 
a third party to effectively view information stored or activity undertaken on a computer.  The 
monitoring is often without the consent of the user and the surreptitious collection of information 
can be used to commit identity theft, fraud or send spam.  Spyware effectively monitors web-
surfing activities and, in doing so, has obvious privacy implications.   
 
Cookies also present a hazard to privacy as they are small files on the computer that can be 
accessed by websites visited by the user.  Some website operators use cookies to gather 
information about a user and share this information with partner websites.  On occasion, a cookie 
could be installed on a computer, without the user’s knowledge or permission, and used to collect 
information about that person’s web surfing habits for advertising or marketing purposes.  
 
Phishing emails are often sent to acquire personal details such as bank account details and 
‘Trojan Horses’ can similarly be uploaded onto computers and used to monitor keystrokes to 
steals the passwords and PINS of accounts. 
 
Changes in IT have had an effect on how individuals perceive cyberprivacy.  In a recent OPC 
survey, 50% of Australians were more concerned about providing information over the Internet 
than they were in 2004.131 At that time, 62% described themselves as having more concerns 
about the security of their personal information online than before. 132 
 
13 CONCLUSION 
 
When Zelman Cowen delivered the 1969 Boyer lectures, titled ‘The Private Man’, he famously 
declared: ‘A man without privacy is a man without dignity’. 133 The concern about privacy of the 
individual has not diminished in the 39 years since Cowen spoke those words.  If anything, it has 
been exacerbated.  Threats in contemporary society together with ongoing technological 
development have meant that privacy has evolved as a concern in the minds of many and faces 
an important period of change and challenge ahead.  
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